- Report 2016 on consequences of a possible Finnish NATO Membership. Three take aways:
- requires referendum – overtaken by events and surging popular support
- Only in lockstep with Sweden
- Axiom not to be forgotten – there is no solution to the Finnish security problem posed by an unstable and unpredictable nuclear superpower neighbor – it can only be managed – now also as a future NATO member
- The Finnish assumption after the demise of the Soviet Union was that EU membership would be the Finnish security solution – unlike Sweden for which EU membership was more trade policy.
- When a “NATO option” was added to the doctrine in 2004 it was derided by activists as an escapist and empty slogan, but it turned out to be a most useful vehicle
- The ”NATO option” reflected a pragmatist tradition. Unlike for Sweden, neutrality or military non-alignment was never an issue of identity for Finland, rather an expression of necessity and a means of survival
- Up to the Russian attack against Ukraine the assumption was that close cooperation with NATO, ever-deepening military integration with Sweden since 2014 and growing cooperation with the US and Britain would suffice.
- The general assumption remained that NATO membership would mean a break with Russia and that Finland should never break with Russia. At the same time the resolve to resist and if needed put up a fight in case Russia would break with Finland was evident and demonstrated by the systematic buildup of Finnish defense.
- For this reason, Finland has the strongest armed forces in the North of Europe
- Already during the long years of the Cold War, with a reference to the Friendship and mutual assistance treaty with Moscow, Finnish defense was characterized as “defense against help” (Arne Olav Brundtland, Norway)
- Strong legacy and unbroken Finnish military tradition explains why Finland never replaced territorial defense with expeditionary defense like Sweden and Germany and others. Participation in expeditionary operations was always considered in terms of its contribution to improving territorial defense
- Compulsory conscription remains popular and is the basis for all officer and NCO recruitment
- Large, trained reserve and constant refresher training
- All services have spearhead capabilities:
- Air Force – JASSM (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile) – released only to Australia and Finland,
- Navy – GABRIEL V (Israeli sea skimming anti-ship missile),
- Army – GMLRS (Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System) – tracked and so more suited to Finnish terrain than e.g., wheeled HIMARS
- Finland has the largest artillery in Europe, reflecting a wartime legacy and Stalin’s adage “artillery is the God of War” (Boh voiny)
- Finnish combat engineers are world class in building defensive barriers, obstacles, traps and laying mines
- After the upgrading of the Finnish Air force with 64 F-35 fighters as replacements for the existing F-18s, the combined Nordic Air Forces with the F-35 of Norway and Denmark and the F-39 Gripens of Sweden will be a formidable force, which the Russian Air force cannot match in the North
- What happened – it was Russia that broke with Europe and the Western World by attacking a neighboring country.
- Putin’s belligerent words triggered an unprecedented NATO debate in Finland and Sweden, which evidently caught the Kremlin by surprise.
- At the end it was not so much Russian trolling about NATO expansion threatening Russian security and thus explicitly denying Finland and Sweden the right to join NATO, that changed the minds in Helsinki and Stockholm.
- It was the unprovoked attack on February 24. This immediately reminded Finland of Stalin’s attack in 1939 and his denial of the right of Finland to exist.
- The change of minds was swift and decisive and the popular support solid
- The Russian miscalculations are numerous. The worst, of course, concerns the underestimation of Ukraine’s will and ability to fight and about the “collective West’s” resolve not to accept the Russian aggression and to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine.
- In this context, Finnish and Swedish NATO membership looks from a Russian perspective more like collateral damage.
- From a purely Russian military view, Finnish and Swedish NATO membership doesn’t change much. Except that it provides additional depth for Norway’s defense of Finnmark.
- Sweden has enjoyed unofficial American guarantees since the 1950s and Finland is an enhanced partner of NATO. Both defense forces are NATO compatible.
- But a look at the map shows that it is a sea change with psychological and political implications, which are not yet clearly discernible.
- The military bases on the long Finnish border 1300 km/800 miles – deep forests with bears and wolves — from Murmansk to Leningrad oblast have been all but emptied and the forces sent to fight in Ukraine – suffering devastating losses.
- This probably explains for the moment why the Russian reaction has so far been muted and not played up in the media nor in the obsequious talk shows
- Dmitry Medvedev’s visit last Tuesday, 26 July to Russian Karelia Petrozavodsk and Sortavala on the Ladoga Sea coast with an excursion to the border crossing in Värtsilä did not mark anything. The puffy faced deputy secretary of the Russian security council repeated the party line. ‘The Finnish and Swedish decision to join NATO is a grave mistake and the Russian response will be symmetrical.
- The strategic center of gravity remains in the North – the Russian second-strike capability based on the Murmansk coast. From this point of view, the Baltic is secondary although vital because of transport links and St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad
- The war in Ukraine has exposed the true state of the Russian army previously considered daunting
- I remain convinced that the outcome of the war in Ukraine will be decided on the battlefield. Why? Because the good news is that Ukraine will never surrender, but the bad news is that Putin will not give up.
- The most important outcome of the war in Ukraine will be its repercussions for Russia proper – A true tsar is victorious like Peter, Alexander, or Stalin. And if not, he is not a true czar.
